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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF U'TAH 
T'HE MOF}j-,AT COUNTY STATE 
BANK, a ·Colorado corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
R. J. PINDER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ST~TEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9166 
Throughout this brief, R indicates pages of the 
record. Some italicized emphasis has been added through-
out by respondent. 
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Respondent agrees with the major portion of the 
statement of the facts as set forth in appellant's brief. 
However, respondent controverts appellant's statement 
made at page 10 of his brief, that the check in question 
was executed and delivered in Utah. (See also pages 18 
and 21 of appellant's brief.) This statement is not true. 
the check was executed and delivered in Colorado (R. 15 
and Supplemental Record). 
Respondent also feels that the circumstances sur-
rounding appellant's stop-payment order should be made 
clear. Appellant appears to take the position that such 
order did not become effective until after the check was 
dishonored and returned to respondent. See page 19 of 
appellant's brief. 
The facts are that on October 17, 1956, the check 
passed through the Clearing House and the Federal Re-
serve Bank of San Francisco at Salt Lake City, in transit 
to the drawee bank at Midvale (R. 8). On October 20th, 
the check was processed by an officer of the drawee 
bank, who, knowing of the appellant's stop-payment order, 
designated it to be returned marked "refer to maker,'' 
because payment had been stopped (R. 6, 8). 8aid bank 
would have paid the check on that day if payment had 
not been stopped (R. 6). 
As a conflict of laws n1atter probably must first be 
resolved in deciding this case, respondent will discuss ap-
pellant's Point II before discussing his Point I. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE LAW OF THE STATE OF COLORADO MUS'T BE 
APPLIED IN DETERMINING THE LEGAL STATUS OF 
PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF IS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE AND, 
THEREFORE, FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION IS NOT A 
DEFENSE TO 'THE ACTION. 
(A) UNDER THE LAW OF UTAH. 
(B) UNDER THE LAW OF COLORADO. 
POINT III. 
PROTEST OF THE CHECK WAS NOT REQUIRED, AND 
THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT DRAWER IS NOT DIS-
CHARGED. 
POINT IV. 
INTERES'T SHOULD BE .COMPUTED FROM THE DATE 
OF DISHONOR. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LAW OF THE STATE OF COLORADO MUS'T BE 
APPLIED IN DETERMINING THE LEGAL STATUS OF 
PLAINTIFF. 
The entire argument of appellant in support of his 
Point II is founded upon a false premise, to-wit, that the 
instant check was drawn in Utah. It was not drawn in 
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Utah, but was executed and delivered in the State of Colo-
rado (R. 15 and Supplemental Record). 
It is interesting to note that appellant, at page 20 
of his brief, seeks to place respondent on the horns of a 
dilemma by assuming that respondent desires to take 
inconsistent positions in regard to this matter of fact. 
Respondent has never contended that this check was an 
inland bill, but has at all times agreed with appellant's 
statement to the lower court that it is a foreign bill. 
Rather, it is appellant, not respondent, who is in serious 
difficulty by attempting to disregard the facts as he, him-
self, stated them to be. He now seeks to deny one of the 
two grounds expressly stated by him as a basis for his 
motion for summary judgment-seeks to deny it, that is, 
until he arrives at his Point III, where it does not seem 
like such a bad idea after all. 
Let's have the record speak for itself, so that we 
may set the fact at rest and proceed to discuss resultant 
legal conclusions. Appellant's 1notion for summary judg-
ment of dismissal (R. 15) reads: 
'~COMES NOW the defendant, R. J. Pinder, 
and moves the Court for its Judgment of no cause 
of action and as grounds for said Motion shows 
the Court as follows: 
"1. That the instrument sued upon is a nego-
tiable instrument which was executed and delimer-
e~d ~11 the State of Wyoming and that the plaintiff 
has not protested the instrument as is required on 
a foreign bill of exchange. 
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"2. [That plaintiff is not a holder in due 
course.] 
" " 
At the hearing of the respective motions for sum-
mary judgment, appellant's counsel stated to the court 
that by mistake the words "State of Wyoming" appear 
in paragraph 1 of his motion instead of "State of Colo-
rado," and that he intended it to read "State of Colorado.'' 
Details in connection with this are set forth in the State-
ment of Proceedings, which was duly settled and ap-
proved by the lower court (Supplemental Record). 
A statement of the grounds for a motion is not mere 
surplusage but is required by URCP Rule 7(b) (1). When 
the statement of the factual grounds for appellant's mo-
tion was acquiesced in by respondent, which it then was 
and at all times has been, it became an admission of a 
fact n1aterial to a decision in the cause. But now appel-
lant, for the first time, attempts to completely reverse his 
position. He now says that the check was executed and 
delivered in Utah, and is an inland bill. In his motion 
for summary judgment, appellant acknowledged the check 
to be a "foreign bill of exchange" and grounded his motion 
upon that fact (R.l5). 
The check is foreign in fact (executed and delivered 
outside Utah) although it appears on its face to be an 
inland bill (purports to be both drawn and payable in 
Utah). See Britton on Bills and Notes (1943) §225. 
There is a difference in the conflicts rule concerning 
liability of a maker of a promissory note or an acceptor 
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of a bill of exchange (who are primarily liable) from the 
rule concerning liability of an indorser or a drawer of a 
bill of exchange (who are secondarily liable). Only the 
second situation is present in the instant case. 
There is also a different rule applicable to (a) mat-
ters concerning the nature and effect of a mercantile 
instrument than to (b) matters concerning the indorse-
ment and transfer thereof. Compare Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws §336 with §349, and compare 11 Am. 
Jur., Conflict of Laws §§ 150, 151 with §148. Matters in 
group (a) are not now being challenged before this court; 
matters in group (b) are. 
Four possible conflicts rules may be considered in 
determining the status of a holder of a bill of exchange 
as against the drawer, i.e., the law of one of four different 
places could conceivably apply: 
(1) Where drawn. 
(2) Where transferred to the holder. 
( 3) Where payable. 
(4) Where sued upon. 
As might be imagined, the authorities are not en-
tirely in agreement as to which jurisdiction should con-
trol. Nevertheless, ( 4), the forum, has been almost uni-
versally rejected. 95 ALR 667. 
As to ( 3), the place payable, liability of the drawer 
of a bill (a secondary party) has generally been held not 
to be governed by the law of the place where it is to be 
paid. 11 Am. Jur. 446, Conflict of Laws §151. It should 
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be observed at this point that nearly every case cited in 
appellant's brief, for the proposition that the place where 
payable governs, is a case involving either the maker of 
a promissory note or the acceptor of a bill of exchange, 
both of whon1 are primarily liable. A careful reading 
of appellant's other authorities will show either that they 
relate to parties primarily liable or that they declare the 
place where a bill was drawn to govern. 
This leaves the question whether the controlling law, 
as between the holder of a bill and the drawer, should be 
that of (1) the place where the bill was drawn, or (2) 
the place where it was transferred to the holder. The 
authorities differ here. It is generally held that the place 
where drawn controls, but there is highly respected au-
thority, most of it recent, that the place of transfer gov-
erns in determining the status of the holder as against the 
drawer. We shall present some group (1) authorities 
first. 
At 11 Am. Jur. 437, Conflict of Laws §144, it is 
stated: 
". . . The question as to what law governs any 
particular relation of contract under negotiable 
paper is best determined, as a general rule, by 
first inquiring whether the liability is a primary 
or a secondary one-that is, whether the person 
is absolutely required to pay the bill or note ac-
cording to its terms, or whether he is only second-
arily or conditionally liable. The law of the place 
where the note or bill is payable ordinarily gov-
erns in Inatters incident to the primary obligation, 
such as the manner or mode of making present-
ment and the details connected therewith, whereas 
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where the liability is conditional and dependent 
upon the necessity for presentment or demand and 
protest, these must be made in accordance with 
the law of the place where the contract of the 
drawer or indorser is made." 
An annotation at 95 ALR 658, published in 1935, dis-
cusses "Conflict of laws as regards title to commercial 
paper and right of holder to enforce it as against the 
drawer or primary obligor." The annotation is appended 
to United States v. Guar,anty Trust Co., discussed below 
as an authority for group (2), place of transfer. It is the 
latest annotation in ALR or ALR 2d on this subject. The 
note supplements prior ones in 19 LRA (NS) 665 and 
61 LRA 193, which express the view that the place where 
the bill was drawn controls. At 19 LRA (NS) 665, 672 
it is stated: 
"Liability of and defenses available to drawer 
or indorser. 
"The later cases recognize and apply the 
general principle stated and formulated at page 
212 of the earlier note [61 LRA 193], to the effect 
that the contract of the drawer or indorser (the 
secondary obligors) is not only a separate contract 
which has a situs of its own independent of that 
of the maker or acceptor (the primary obligor) but 
also that his obligation is to pay, in the event of 
the default of the primary obligor, nO't at the place 
oi payment expressly or impliedly named in the 
bill or note, but at the place where iJn a legal sense, 
h~s contract was 'made. 
At 61 LRA 193, 212 the annotator states: 
"[Discussion of argun1ent, sometimes made, 
that law of place of payn1ent should govern.] But 
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it is held by the great weight of authority not only 
that the contract of the drawer and indorser is a 
separate and independent contract, but also that 
such eontract is to pay, in the event of the default 
of the prirnary obligor, not at the place of payment 
expressly or in1pliedly in the bill or note, but at 
the place where, in a legal sense, the contract of 
the drawer or indorser was made." 
More recent authority supports group (2), that 
the place of transfer to the holder controls. At 11 Am. 
Jur. 441, Conflict of Laws §148, it is stated: 
"Law Gove,rning Indorsements and Trans-
fers; Rights of H alders- The transfer of a nego-
tiable instrument is a new and independent con-
tract. According to the general rule, this transfer 
is governed by the law of the place where it is 
made. . . . The English decisions leave the general 
question of what law governs the transfer of com-
mercial paper in a somewhat unsettled state. The 
recent tendency, however, in cases where the in-
struments are transferred by indorsement, is to 
hold that the validity of the transfer must be 
governed by the law of the country in which the 
transfer takes place. 
"This same rule applies where the transfer 
is by indorsement; that is, it is governed by the 
law of the place where the indorsement is made, 
and not by the law of the place where the bill 
or note is payable or where suit thereon is brought 
or the law of the place of residence of the indorser. 
"The t~tle of a holder of a negotiable instru-
ment which depends 'ttpon a transfer by indorse-
ment or otherwise is li,kewise governed by the law 
of the place where the indorsement or transfer ~s 
made. 
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"The question also arises as to the law gov-
erning the title and the right to recover of an in-
dorsee under a foreign indorsement of a bill or 
note, as against the maker, the drawer, or the ac-
ceptor. In this respect, a distinction has been 
drawn in England between what are designated 
as 'inland bills' (negotiable paper made and to be 
paid in the same country) and 'foreign bills' (nego-
tiable paper made in one country and to be paid or 
accepted in another). In the case of inland bills, 
the view is taken that the validity of the indorse-
ment and its sufficiency to convey title to the 
holder so that he may recover against the primary 
obligor or the drawer are to be determined not by 
the law of the place where the indorsement is 
made, if it is made at a place other than that where 
the instrument was executed or is to be paid, but 
by the law governing the primary obligor's or 
drawer's contract. On the other hand, in the case 
of foreign bills-bills drawn in one country upon 
a drawee in another-the opposite view is taken, 
to the effect that the law of the place of indorse-
ment governs the title of the indorsee and his right 
to recover from the primary obligor or the drawer. 
"[Footnote 9 :] Annotation: 95 ALR 662, 663. 
The distinction pointed out between an inland 
bill and a foreign bill seems to proceed upon sound 
legal principles. The drawer or acceptor of an 
inland bill contemplates the negotiation of the bill 
only in the country of its origination, and there-
fore, even if, contrary to such contemplation, the 
bill is indorsed in a foreign country, he undertakes 
to pay to the holder only in the event his title is 
good according to the law of the country where 
his (drawer's or acceptor's) liability originated, 
irrespective of what 1nay be the status of the title 
under the law of the country where the indorse-
10 
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1nent is made. Not so with the drawer or acceptor 
of a foreign bill. He contemplates that the bill 
will be negotiated in foreign countries and his 
undertaking may, in this view, be said to be to 
pay to anyone who acquires a good title, wherever 
the bill is negotiated, irrespective of what the 
status of the title might be under a like indorse-
ment if made in the country where his (the 
drawer's or acceptor's) liability originates. Anno-
tation: 95 A.L.R. 665." 
In 1934 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled 
upon the question in UniJted States v. Guaranty Trust 
Co., 293 U.S. 340, 79 L. Ed. 415, 55 S. ·Ct. 221, 95 ALR 
G51. In this case a check was drawn and delivered in 
the District of Columbia upon a bank in the District of 
Columbia. It was subsequently indorsed and transferred 
to defendant in Jugoslavia. The Supreme Court held 
that the law of the country to which a check payable to 
one there resident was mailed by the drawer governs the 
determination of the question whether good title thereto 
can be acquired by a transferee in due course where its 
purported indorsement by the payee was there forged. 
If the holder's title is good there, it is good elsewhere, 
even in a country where it would not have been good if 
the forgery had there taken place. 
The rule of this case, that the law of the place of 
indorsement governs, has been followed in United States 
v. Lemons, (DC Mo) 67 F. Supp 985 (1946), and in P1m-
tel v. K.N.H. Mohamed & Bros., et .al., 107 Cal. App. 2d 
328, 237 P2d 315 ( 1951). 
11 
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The Restatement of Conflict of Laws makes no dis-
tinction between inland and foreign bills, or between 
primary and secondary liability, but refers to the law of 
the place of transfer to determine whether or not a holder 
takes good title : 
"§349. TRANS:E.,ER OF NEGOTIABLE 
INSTRUMENT. 
"The validity and effect of .a transfer of a 
negotiable instrument are determined by the law 
of the place where the instrument is at the time 
or its transfer. 
"Comment: 
" 
"e. While any defense which grows out of 
the original making or discounting of a negotiable 
instrument is governed by the law of the place of 
contracting, a defense which grows out of the cir-
cumstances of the transfer is determined by the 
law of the place of transfer. 
"Illustration: 
"1. A negotiable bill of exchange, drawn in 
State X, is delivered over to a bona fide holder 
with a forged indorsement in State Y. By the law 
of X, a forged indorsement does not transfer the 
instrument; by the law of Y a bona fide holder 
gets title. The holder takes a good title to the bill." 
Goodrich on Conflict of Laws (Third Edition) sup-
ports this view, at page 498: 
"That the law of the place of transfer governs 
is supported by authority, though there has been 
surprisingly little litigation of the question." 
Where the place the bill was drawn and the place 
of transfer is the same, the question as to which of the 
12 
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two controls need not be decided, of course. Under the 
facts in the instant case, as respondent feels them 
clearly to be established, the check was both drawn by 
appellant and subsequently transfer '"0 r1 to respondent in 
Colorado. 
By the consensus of nearly all opinion dealing with 
the conflict of laws rule applicable to the right of a holder 
of a bill of exchange to enforce it against the drawer, 
the place where it was drawn or the place where it was 
transferred to the holder controls. The place of transfer 
is preferred by most recent authorities. But either doc-
trine invokes the law of Colorado in this case. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIF F IS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE AND, 
THEREFORE, FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION IS NOT A 
DEFENSE TO THE ACTION. 
(A) UNDER THE LAW OF UTAH. 
Appellant relies upon the decision in Western Cream-
ery Co. v. Malia, et .al., 89 Utah 422, 57 P (2d) 743. For 
the reasons stated above, it is respectfully submitted that 
the law of Utah is not determinative of respondent's 
status as against appellant. But even if it were, we feel 
that the Western Creamery case is not in point under 
our factual situation for the reason that there the de-
positor did not draw against the check nor receive any 
payment thereon. In other words, there the bank of de-
posit did not give any value for it. 
13 
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(B) UNDER THE LAW OF COLORADO. 
No discussion is necessary of the established rule 
that a holder in due course holds the instrument free from 
the defense of failure of consideration that may be avail-
able to prior parties among themselves. NIL 57. And 
every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due 
course. NIL §59. 
Is respondent a holder in due course under Colorado 
law~ 
In Colorado, a bank becomes the owner of a check 
deposited with it when it extends credit to the depositor 
and permits the depositor to withdraw against such 
credit, although the deposit agreement provides that the 
bank is merely an agent for collection. The Colorado case, 
Bromfield v. Cochr.an et al., 283 Pac. 45, 86 Colo. 486, 
is controlling in the situation now before this court, and 
it is felt appropriate to quote from this decision at length 
here: 
" 
uMoore., J. George A. Stahl, as receiver of 
the Broadway National Bank, brought suit in the 
county court of the city and county of Denver 
against Cochran & Cochran, co-partners, the 
Rockwell Investment Company, and the Parker 
Realty Company, corporations, to recover $652.41. 
The complaint charged that the Rockwell Invest-
ment Company and the Parker Realty Company, 
for a valuable consideration, ma.de, executed and 
delivered a certain check drawrn on the Inter-
national Trust Company, dated D·ecember 16, 
1925, and payable to Horace B. Cochran and 
James M. Cochran in the sum of $1,497.30; that 
14 
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said check was indorsed unconditionally by the 
payees, and thereafter deposited in their account 
at the Broadway National Bank, payees using a 
deposit slip which contained the following pro-
visions: 'All checks, drafts and other items drawn 
on or payable at other banks are offered for 
deposit to, and received by, this bank as a for-
warding agency * * * and will be credited pro-
v~sionally sttbject to final cash payment, the bank 
reserving the right to decline payment of checks 
drawn against such credits,' that said amount 
was credited to the account of defendants Cochran 
& Cochran, who thereupon were permitted to 
draw and drew against said check, sums aggre-
gating $652.41, and that the bank became thereby 
the owner thereof. Thereafter payment upon s>aiJd 
check was stopped, and this suit was instituted 
to recover the amount thus paid out, $652.41, to-
gether with interest at 8 per cent, from December 
16, 1925. Cochran & Cochran failed to appear, 
and judgment was entered against them in the 
county court. 
"The defendants the Rockwell Investment 
·Company and the Parker Realty Company an-
swered, admitting the execution and delivery of 
said check, and that payment thereof had been 
stopped because of alleged fraud perpetrated by 
the payees upon the makers. By stipulation, the 
allegations contained in the complaint and answer, 
for the purposes of the trial, were admitted as 
if proven. The county court thereupon entered 
judgment for the defendant, from which plaintiff 
appealed to the district court. Upon a trial there, 
under a similar stipulation, judgment was again 
rendered in favor of the defendants, which the 
plaintiff now seeks to review, contending that 
the court erred in failing to render judgment 
for the plaintiff. 
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"From the foregoing, it is apparent that the 
sole question for determination of this court is: 
Was the Broadway Bank the owner of s.aid check 
or merely an .agent of the depositors for coUec-
tion? If tvtle to the check passed to the bamlc, it 
should recover, otherwise not. 
"[1, 2] We have held that, where a check is 
drawn on one bank and unconditionally deposited 
in another, the latter becomes merely an agent 
of the depositor, and title does not pass to said 
bank; and further that, under such circumstances, 
iJf the bank of deposit extends credit and permits 
the depositor to withdraw the amount of the check, 
the bank becomes the owner thereof. See Union 
Bank v. Motor Company, 70 Colo. 132, 197 P. 753; 
Manatee Bank v. Fruit Company, 70 Colo. 342, 
201 P. 560; First National Bank v. Fleming State 
Bank, 7 4 Colo. 309, 221 P. 891 and Scully v. 
Denver National Bank, 76 Colo. 227, 230 P. 610. 
"Defendant corporations contend that the 
provisions contained in the deposit slip aforesaid 
are controlling, and that thereby the bank became 
merely an agent of the depositor, and that the 
subsequent extension of credit to the depositor 
and withdrawal of funds did not change the con-
tract of deposit so as to then pass title to the 
bank. In support thereof, the Fleming case, supra, 
is cited. We are of the opinion that this case is 
not decisive of defendants' claims . . ." 
" 
"'In this state the general custom and under-
standing is that, when a customer deposits in 
his bank checks drawn on another bank, they are 
received for collection, and are charged to the 
custon1er's account if dishonored. Some banks, 
by way of precaution, print upon their deposit 
slips notice to this effect. The banks generally, 
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in the absence of special notice, regard such 
transactions as deposits for collection, and, even 
when credited to a checking account, the right 
recognized by the law merchant to charge back 
to the account a dishonored check is exercised. 
Town of Manitou v. First Nat. Bank of Colorado 
Springs, 37 Colo. 344, 356, 86 P. 75.' 
"[3] Applying these principles to the instant 
case, we must necessarily hold that the intention 
of the parties is controlling: that, pursuant to 
the provisions of the depos~t slip, plaintiff bank, 
at the time of deposit, was merely an agent to 
collect; that, when it credited the .amount of saiJd 
check to the payees' account, and thereupon pa~d 
to them $652.41 on account thereof, ~t thereby 
electe:d not to exercise the right to decU'ne pay-
ment thereof as provided by the te.rms of sa~d 
deposit slip; and that the payment so made and 
the receipt thereof by the depositor evidenced an 
intenti;on of the parties that a sale of said check 
be consummated, and the bank thereby became 
the owner of sai;d check. 
"Our conclusions herein are fortifved by all 
of the Colorado cases hereinabove set forth. De-
fendant authorized the circulation of their ne-
gotiable instrument in the commercial world, and 
thereby represented that it was their valid and 
binding obligation to pay the amount thereof to 
any innocent party who held the same for value 
and without notice of any claimed infirmity. It 
would be unjust and inequitable under all the 
circumstances in this case to hold that the plain-
tiff bank, an entirely innocent party, should suffer 
a loss of $652.41. Certainly, in all fairness, as 
between plaintiff bank and the defendants, the 
loss should fall upon the defendants which cause 
it to exist. 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The judgment of the lower court is there-
fore reversed, with directions to enter judgment 
for the plaintiff in the sum of $652.41, together 
with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent 
per annum from December 16, 1925, to date. 
"Reversed." 
Argument was made by appellant in the court below 
that the recent Colorado case, Cox} et al vs. Metropolitan 
State Bank} Inc. et alJ 336 P2d 742 (1959) overruled 
Bromfveld vs. Cochran. This is clearly not so, for the 
following reasons. 
In the Cox case four of the five judges of the court 
each wrote a separate opinion. There were two specially 
concurring opinions, and two of the judges dissented. 
The case was decided by two of the five on a theory of 
law entirely different from that expressed in Bromf~eld 
vs. Cochran} i.e., that under the facts of the Cox case 
the check deposited was the subject of a trust, and 
that the depositor had no beneficial interest in it. These 
two judges did not mention the Bromfield case in any 
way. Further, the specially concurring opinion of Justice 
Frantz, relied on by appellant below, quotes from and 
cites the Bromfield case without any expression of dis-
approval. 
Justice Frantz' specially concurring opinion is not 
the opinion of the court. Actually, it only concurs in 
the result, on a different theory. The dissenting opinion 
of Justice Hall, in which Chief Justice Knauss joined 
without reservation, is certainly entitled to as much 
weight. At page 758, Justice I-Iall says: 
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''I find not one word in this specially con-
curring opinion that sanctions one word of the 
1najority opinion, and in my humble opinion it 
might with equal if not greater propriety be 
labelled 'dissenting' instead of 'concurring.'" 
Appellant also argues that there is no evidence of 
an intention concurred in by both Arnn (the payee-
depositor) and the respondent bank to change respond-
ent's status fron1 agent-to-collect to owner. There is 
such evidence. See Stipulation paragraphs 5 and 6 (R. 
8). If anyone knew that the consideration for the check 
had failed, Arnn knew it. He was the promissor. He 
must have known that as a consequence it was likely 
not to be paid. Nevertheless, he sought respondent's 
paYJnent of checks, totaling more than $2,000, drawn 
by him subsequently against the same account- checks 
which he Inust have known would seriously overdraw 
the account if the Pinder check was not paid. And re-
spondent, in good faith, did pay those checks when they 
were presented. Contracts may be changed by the parties 
to them by implication as well as by express agreement. 
See 12 Am J ur 1006, §428. 
This subject is discussed thoroughly in a recent 
annotation in 59 ALR 2d 1173, entitled "Crediting pro-
ceeds of negotiable paper to depositor's account, as 
constituting bank a holder in due course." The anno-
tator concludes, at page 1187, that: 
"The general rules that a bank is a holder 
in due course when the proceeds of the deposited 
itmn have been withdrawn from the account or 
other-mse applied have been followed by most 
of the courts considering the question, notwith-
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standing the fact that the instrument may have 
been received by the bank for collection, or the 
proceeds credited provisionally to the account of 
the depositor. [Citing 17 jurisdictions, including 
Colorado's Bromfield vs. Cochran, in support.]" 
Attention is particularly called to the following 
sections of this annotation 
"§5. Proceeds partially withdrawn. 
"·§6. Receipt for collection, or conditionally; 
indorsement for deposit only. 
"·§7. What amounts to withdrawal or credit, 
generally; computation." 
It is significant that the ALR 2d Supplement Serv-
ice, 1960 Issue, does not cite Cox vs. Metropolitan State 
Bank in any way in connection with this annotation. 
Whichever rule might be deemed to best meet the 
needs of the business and financial community, it is 
respectfully suggested that the Court's function in our 
case is not to determine this. Rather, in this confict of 
laws situation, this court will determine what the law 
of Colorado is - not what, perhaps, it should be. 
BromfiJeld vs. Cochran is definite and certain in 
its holding that under circumstances present in our case 
a bank is a holder in due course. 
POINT III. 
PROTEST OF THE CHECK WAS NOT REQUIRED, AND 
THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT DRAWER IS NOT DIS-
CHARGED. 
Appellant contends that failure of respondent to 
protest the check discharged appellant. 
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The general conflicts rule governing the necessity 
of protest as a condition of holding the drawer of a 
bill is deterrnined by the law of the place where the 
bill was drawn. 11 Am Jur 443, Conflict of Laws §149. 
But since there is no showing that the law requiring 
or dispensing with protest is any different in Colorado 
than in Utah, Colorado law may be deemed to be the 
same as Utah's in this connection. In fact, appell~nt has 
relied upon the Utah statute in his Point III. 
Appellant intimates that respondent cannot decide 
whether to treat the check as inland or foreign. This 
is not true. Respondent has not been, and will not be, 
evasive about this. It is in accord with the proposition 
that this check is a foreign bill, executed and delivered 
outside of Utah (R. 15 and Statement of Proceedings). 
It believes this to_ be the fact. Respondent acknowledges 
that it did not protest the instrument and that iJf, under 
the facts disclosed by the record, protest was required, 
respondent cannot prevail. 
It is true that foreign bills of exchange must ordi-
narily be protested. UCA, 1953, 44-2-27 (NIL §152). 
Was the check in question a foreign bill appearing on 
its face to be such~ 
It is foreign in fact (it was executed and delivered 
in Colorado) but it appears on its face to be an inland 
bill (purports to be both drawn and payable in Utah). 
See Britton on Bills and Notes ( 1943) §225. 
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UCA, 1953, 44-2-27 (NIL §152) states: 
". . . Where a bill does not appear on its 
face to be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case 
of dishonor is unnecessary." 
There is another reason why appellant's contention 
that this check was required to be protested is insup-
portable. UCA, 1953, 44-2-34 (NIL §159) provides: 
"When protest dispensed with-Protest is 
dispensed with by any circumstances which would 
dispense with notice of dishonor .... " 
U·CA, 1953, 44-1-116 (NIL §114) provides: 
"When notvce need not be given to drawer-
Notice of dishonor is not required to be given to 
the drawer in any of the following cases: 
" ( 5) Where the drawer has countermanded 
payment." 
See Stipulation paragraph 7 (R. 8). 
Britton on Bills and Notes (1943) §221, states the 
reason for the foregoing rules as follows, at page 928: 
"Notice of dishonor to the drawer is not re-
quired where, in the language of Section 114(5), 
he 'has countern1anded payment,' for ·the reason 
that the drawer's own act causes the dishonor of 
the instrument. A drawer of a check who stops 
payment thereon is therefore not entitled to 
notice of dishonor, nor is he entitled to present-
ment of such check, for it is held, under Section 
79 that the stop order n1akes the situation one 
where the drawer 'has no right to expect or re-
quire that the drawee or acceptor will pay the 
instrument.'" 
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Appellant contends, at page 19 of his brief, that 
a duty to protest existed, notwithstanding the foregoing, 
because respondent did not know of the stop-payment 
order until later. Appellant entirely overlooks a basic 
reason for the rules dispensing with notice of dishonor 
and protest, i.e., to inform the drawer that his secondary 
liability has ripened, so that he may promptly take ap-
propriate action. The purpose for the rule, requiring 
protest, is for the holder to do something that is usually 
useful to the drawer -not to require the holder to do 
a useless, meaningless act. 
The check was marked "refer to maker" but was 
returned unpaid because payment had been stopped. 
Stipulation paragraph 7 (R. 8) states : 
'". . . defendant notified the Midvale Branch 
of the Sandy City Bank to refuse payment and 
said Bank for such reason did refuse payment 
when the check was presented." 
Exhibit A annexed to Defendant's Demand for Ad-
mission (R. 6) reads: 
" ... This check was subsequently processed 
by an officer of the Bank, who, knowing of the 
Stop-Payment Order, designated the check to be 
returned marked 'Refer to Maker.' 
" 
"I further certify that on October 20, 1956, 
if payment had not been stopped O'YI the check 
described, this bank would have pa~d that check, 
even though it would have resulted in an over-
draft of $531.54." 
.. A.ccordingly, it is evident that protest of this check 
was not required and that appellant is not discharged 
from liability for it. 
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POINT IV. 
INTERES'T SHOULD BE COMPUTED FROM THE DATE 
OF DISHONOR. 
Interest owing to respondent, upon non-payment of 
the check, should be computed from the date of dishonor 
at the rate of six per cent per annum, irrespective of 
whether the law of Utah or the law of Colorado is 
deemed to apply for such purpose. The governing princi-
ples and the rate of interest are the same in both juris-
dictions. UCA, 1953, 15-1-1. Colorado Revised Statutes, 
1953, 73-1-2. The Colorado section declares: 
"Creditors allowed six per cent- Creditors 
shall be allowed to receive interest, when there 
is no agreement as to the rate thereof, at the 
rate of six per cent per annum, for all moneys 
after they become due, on any bill, bond, promis-
sory note or other instru1nent of writing, . . . 
[balance of section not material]." 
In Bromfield vs. Cochran, interest was computed 
from the date of the check. In our case it should be 
computed at least from the date of dishonor, October 
20, 1956. 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
The facts as stated in the record on appeal, including 
the supplemental record, are controlling, of course. No 
one seriously pretends that the law of the State of 
Wy01ning is in any way involved. 
The law of Colorado is applicable under recognized 
conflict of laws rules, be~ause the check was drawn 
there and it was transferred to respondent there. The 
place of transfer is preferred by most recent authori-
ties in detennining the status of a holder as against 
the drawer. But either doctrine invokes the law of Colo-
rado in this case. 
Under the rule declared in Bromf~eld vs. Cochra;n, 
plaintiff is a holder in due course and, therefore, failure 
of consideration is not a defense. 
Bromfield vs. Cochran declares the law of Colorado 
at the present time. Further, it follows the general rule 
that a bank becomes the owner of a check deposited 
with it when it extends credit to the depositor and per-
mits the depositor to withdraw against such credit, 
notwithstanding the deposit agreement provides that the 
bank is merely an agent for collection. 
Protest is dispensed with by any circumstance-s 
which dispense with notice of dishonor. Notice of dis-
honor is not required to be given to the drawer where 
the drawer has countermanded payment. Appellant 
stopped payment of the instant check. 
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Interest should be computed from the date of dis-
honor under the circumstances present in this case. The 
applicable rate of interest is six per cent per annum . 
.Accordingly, respondent respectfully sub1nits that 
the lower court's judgment awarding respondents 
$2,216.03 principal should be affirmed, and interest at 
the rate of six per cent per annum from October 20, 
1956, to date should be awarded in addition thereto. 
CHARLES WELCH and 
VICTOR A. SPENCER 
By Victor A. Spencer 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
Received two copies of the foregoing Brief of Re-
spondent this ~--------------- day of March, 1960. 
' 
Irving H. Biele 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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